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ABSTRACT 
This thesis conducts a qualitative analysis of the Russian foreign policy concept from 2016, as 
it is presented on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The 
analysis is based on the aspirational constructivist theory and is realized by utilizing a functional 
idea analysis with elements of argument analysis. By applying these tools this thesis is enabled 
to analyze implied messages as well as to provide a different approach in the analysis of strictly 
political documents.  
The analysis is based in aspirational constructivism; a theory that seeks to find 
out a state’s national identity in order to determine the state’s political purpose. In turn, the 
political purpose creates political aspirations and therefore national interests. By utilizing all of 
the above-mentioned tools, this thesis aims to analyze how ideas about NATO, ethno-
linguistics, and economics are manifested in the foreign policy concept. With this as a 
foundation the thesis will then discuss some open questions regarding how this new foreign 
policy concept, and as such Russia’s national identity, might affect the European Union’s 
security, territory and economy. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Russian foreign policy is a heavily debated subject among many researchers around the globe. 
This thesis is an addition to that research and applies a theory based on the assumption that 
national identities greatly influence national interests and political decisions. The applied 
theory, called aspirational constructivism, is grounded in the work of Anne L. Clunan (2009) 
entitled The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence. As such, the thesis strongly 
differentiates itself from various realist approaches, for example John J. Mearsheimer (2014) in 
Vems fel är Ukrainakrisen?1 or Elena Kropatcheva (2012) in “Russian foreign policy in the 
realm of European security through the lens of neoclassical realism”2 by applying identity 
theories on top of its many similarities to realism. 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze how the Russian national identity based in 
aspirational constructivism creates aspirations regarding NATO, the economy and the ethno-
linguistic dimension, and how these aspirations are manifested in the most recently approved 
foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation. These dimensions have been chosen because 
they are particularly noticeable in the foreign policy concept and they all affect the European 
Union. On the base of this concrete aim, I formulate the following open questions: Is it likely 
that Russia will wage war against the EU? How might Russian expansionist tendencies affect 
the EU? And, what may Russia’s Eastern economic expansion mean for the EU? These open 
questions are brought up and discussed because they come to mind when going through the 
analysis. However, due to our limited material, the questions will only be discussed and not 
answered. It is important to mention that this is not a full feathered analysis of Russia’s foreign 
policy nor of the questions at hand due to the fact that we do not get into any subject that only 
emphasizes the U.S. – Russia relationship along with other factors that this thesis may overlook. 
This is due to a selection process conducted to maximize clarity in both the analysis of the 
document and its conclusions regarding the above formulated questions.  
 
2.0 THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
2.1 Aspirational Constructivism 
This thesis is built upon the theory called aspirational constructivism as it is presented in Anne 
L. Clunans book: The social construction of Russia’s resurgence. Hence this book sets the 
                                                          
1 John J. Mearsheimer, Vems fel är Ukrainakrisen?, (Stockholm: Karneval förlag, 2014). 
2 Elena Kropatcheva, “Russian foreign policy in the realm of European security through the lens of neoclassical 
realism,”Journal of Eurasian Studies (Vol. 3, No. 1), January 2012, accessed May 16, 2017, pages 30-40, 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S187936651100025X.  
4 
 
major framework and foundation of the coming analysis and it is of great importance in how 
the study of the foreign policy concept is conducted.  
Aspirational constructivism is a theory that focuses on the creation of identities 
and its significance in the formation of national interests. Nonetheless, it has its similarities with 
other theories, one of these being the rationalist branch of realism. This is explained by James 
G. March and Johan P. Olsen as if political behaviors and actions were the results of the political 
elite’s desires in, and the expected consequences of, particular situations.3 According to 
William C. Wohlforth, such particular situations are usually defined by material factors. For 
instance, military balance, geography or economic interdependence. In his belief, the notion of 
material constraints is what dictates whether a country has a national interest in accumulating 
wealth and power by engaging in either conflict or cooperation.4 Other realists agreeing with 
that statement are, for instance, Randall L. Schweller5 and Stephen G. Brooks.6 
In contrast, aspirational constructivism does not consider such material factors as 
sufficient when analyzing national interests and political behaviors, instead, it defines national 
identities as being the underlying factor of national interests. National identities are believed to 
be highly changeable and influenced by the political elite who in turn are influenced by human 
reason as well as the past and the present.7 Because of this, aspirational constructivism is in this 
thesis considered to be more complex than its realist counterpart. Additionally, realism 
contradicts several aspects of aspirational constructivism. For example, the realist oriented 
researcher John G. Ikenberry concluded that after the Cold War world politics would be 
significantly altered and that NATO faced an inevitable downfall.8 Of course, in retrospect it is 
well known that this never occurred. Subsequently, it exposed the flaws of realism which is 
something that aspirational constructivism is looking to make up for. Aspirational 
                                                          
3 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” 
International Organization 52, (no. 4 1998), 947-948, 943-969, 
http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=5&sid=f2bc046d-8486-43ad-afb1-
424d2b3f1dc7@sessionmgr4008&hid=4213.  
4 William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” International Security (Vol. 19, No. 3,1994/95): 
107-108, 111-112, 115, http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=7da4d772-
85cd-4954-8c6b-48490cc821d3@sessionmgr4010&vid=5&hid=4213.  
5 Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, “Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the 
Cold War,” Security Studies 9 (3) 2000: 86, 90. 
6 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War: 
Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas. International Security 25 (3), 2000/2001: 29-31, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626705?seq=25#page_scan_tab_contents.  
7Anne Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests 
(Baltimore MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 7-8. 
8 John G. Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” 
International Security 23 (3), 1998, 43-44. 
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constructivism therefore opposes certain aspects of realism and consequently it will not be a 
subject of further discussion in this thesis. 
Being a branch of constructivism itself, as the name implies, aspirational 
constructivism contains many of the ideas that are fundamental to the previous. Constructivism, 
according to Alexander Wendt, does not undermine the effect of material factors. Instead, these 
factors are considered to be highly influenced by cultural aspects, norms, and identity. These 
are in turn based on societal ideas, or rather, they are based on how human agents perceive 
society.9 As Wendt proclaims: “How agents perceive the world is important in explaining their 
actions, and they always have an element of choice in defining their identities and interests.”10 
Further on, Wendt argues that social structures too are imperative to constructivism. Such social 
structures are also referred to as the international community’s distribution of practices, norms, 
and identities.11 However, Clunan criticizes both Wendt’s and other constructivists’ approaches 
to social structures as they tend to focus only on the present, effectively ignoring the influence 
of history, which she also claims is the case for realism.12 
 Notwithstanding, there are constructivist approaches that do account for history, 
for example, Ted Hopf (2002) in Social Construction of International Politics.13 However, his 
approach is still lacking in explaining the role of history in how identities change and develop.14 
Clunan makes up for such shortages by merging constructivism with social psychology, 
predominantly with the work of social identity theorists15 such as Alexander L. George16 and 
Robert Jervis17. Additionally, she supports costructivists Rawi Abdelal’s18 and Andrei P. 
Tsygankov’s19 idea that a state’s political interests are molded after its main national identity. 
Primarily, the concept of self-esteem is established as one of the theory’s most 
important corner stones. Self-esteem, in this context, should be viewed on a national and 
                                                          
9 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge, New York and Port Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), accessed May 17, 2017, 135-138. http://www.guillaumenicaise.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Wendt-Social-Theory-of-International-Politics.pdf.  
10 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 137-138. 
11 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Chap. 4 and Chap. 7. 
12 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 5-6. 
13 Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 
1999, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), Chap. 4. 
14 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 7. 
15 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 3, 8. 
16 Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980). 
17 Roberet Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976). 
18 Rawi Abdelal, National Purpose in the World Economy: Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective, 
Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
19 Andrei P. Tsygankov Pathways after Empire: National Identity and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-
Soviet World, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001). 
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collective level. Like national identities, a national self-image is a collection of ideas dealing 
with the political purpose and the international position of a state. The difference here is that 
several national self-images can exist simultaneously and only when one of these images are 
chosen does it become a national identity. In other words, when the political elite of a country 
experiences a low national self-esteem this should create aspirations which themselves are 
based on the nation’s historical memory and its current political situation. Thus, these 
aspirations are key in the formation of national interests.20  
 Such an attempt to improve national self-esteem is also called an identity 
management strategy. These strategies are seen in the political discourse and are typically 
divided into three sections: creativity, competition and mobility.21 
On one hand, a creative strategy may attempt to create new or reform how 
existing, national attributes are perceived, or it may entail manipulation of other’s positive 
elements hence making it look as a negative feature. It may be a switch of perspectives and so 
comparing oneself to another inferior group rather than to a greater one, or it may simply be a 
comparison to the superior entity but along a different dimension. On the other hand, a 
competitive strategy might try to mobilize “resources to improve the group’s” standing in 
relation to another group and a mobility strategy may leave or disown one group in an effort to 
become a part of another, more positively viewed, group.22 One example of this is how Russia 
attempted to join the west and pass for a liberal democracy by rejecting its past; a dominant 
strategy during both Gorbachev and Yeltsin.23  
In order for identity strategies to convert a self-image into a national identity, the 
self-image must pass both a history test and an efficacy test in the eyes of the state’s political 
elite. Clunan describes these tests: “a history test [is a test] of the appropriateness of the image’s 
portrayal of useable and important elements derived from the country’s past, and an efficacy 
test [is a test] of the image’s practicality”.24 
 
 
                                                          
20 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 3-4, 12, 23. 
21 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 24, 29, 34. 
22 Alexei Shevchenko and Deborah Welch Larson, “Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the 
Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy,” International Organization 57, 2003, accessed May 17, 2017, page 79, 
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=399f3dc0-e6a1-465f-839d-
678d039928f3@sessionmgr103&hid=120.  
23 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 83. 
24 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 37. 
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2.2 Aspirational constructivism in the context of Russia as applied by the work of Anne L. 
Clunan 
The fall of the Soviet Union should in the view of aspirational constructivism be a cause for 
identity crisis and low national self-esteem. This should then create a psychological need among 
the political elite to reform the national self-image, the political discourse and its identity 
management strategies.25 During the 1990s in post-Soviet Russia, five different self-images 
were in competition with each other; the western self-image, the statist self-image, the national 
restorationist self-image, the neocommunist self-image, and the slavophile self-image.26  
 All of these have in common that they view Russia as being part of the great 
power group and they all have a negative assessment of Russia’s position in that group.27 
Below, the statist developmentalist self-image, a branch of statism, will be thoroughly 
explained as the other four self-images are set aside. With Vladimir Putin as president, this 
national identity is expected to greatly influence political decisions.28 However, it is important 
to point out that statist developmentalism did experience opposition from the other self-images 
and political elites were never able to reach consensus on Russia’s political purpose. Ought the 
Russian Federation follow a unique Russian path or should it implement Western systems.29 
Consequently, the Russian aspiration to attain its rightful superpower status served as a stand-
in for the state’s political purpose which, according to Clunan, is “the root of Russia’s instability 
and inconsistency in foreign policy”.30  
 Clunan defines statism’s main characteristics as: the view that Russia is part of 
the great power group due to its Soviet and tsarist history, the desire to integrate the former 
Soviet Union (FSU) under Russian leadership, the wish to establish a powerful centralized 
polity which does not favor the former soviet economic model, and the implementation of 
citizenships based on loyalty to the state and adaptation to the Russian language and culture. 
This differs greatly from the Western aspirations and view on citizenship, which contributes to 
Clunan’s interpretation of Russia being neither Western nor Eastern.  
                                                          
25 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 53. 
26 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 60. 
27 Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. White, “A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical 
Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly 58 (4), 1995, 259-
260. 
28 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 65-66. 
29 Mikhail K. Gorshkov, “Dynamics of Elite Attitudes regarding Russia’s Proper Political Purpose,” Vneshniaia 
Politika Rossii: Mneniia Ekspertov, (Moscow: RNICiNP po zakazu moskovskovo predstavitel’stva Fonda im. F. 
Eberta, 2001). 
30 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 140-143. 
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 From statism comes statist developmentalism, which in addition to what is 
formulated above, seeks cooperation with the West on economic and technological areas. In 
that view, economics is the key driver in politics. Technological and economic resources are 
here what characterize a state’s strength. The self-image focuses largely on industrial 
advancement and economic modernity, consequently, it wishes to be included into both regional 
and global organizations. This integration must be accomplished on Russia’s own terms as to 
not belittle Russia’s great power status. Furthermore, statist developmentalism desires only to 
integrate economically with those former Soviet republics that obtain a military and industrial 
infrastructure that would strengthen Russia’s economy and its military capacity. Such countries 
include for example Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.31  
 Typical identity management strategies for statist developmentalism is social 
competition strategies along with creativity strategies. A creativity strategy could in Russia’s 
case entail diminishing the United States military along a different dimension than simply its 
power. Instead it might look down on its “over-involvement” in the issues of other states. 
According to Clunan, Russia sees this involvement as excessive partly because of its 19th 
century perspective on world politics which “putatively mean[-t] non-interference in another 
state’s political economic system and [that] great powers respect[-ed] one another’s sphere 
while jointly managing global security.”32 Therefore, there is a lack of understanding for state 
involvement in matters of other countries’ humanitarian issues.  
A social competition strategy in the case of Russia may entail comparing 
themselves to the U.S. in order to create a perception of equal power status. For example, 
referring to an example from Clunan’s work, were Putin makes a statement regarding the 
September 11 attacks in the U.S.33  
 
Russia is one of the most reliable guarantors of international stability. It is Russia’s principled 
position that has made it possible to form a strong anti-terrorist coalition…Our major goal in 
foreign policy is to ensure strategic stability in the world. To do this, we are participating in the 
creation of a new system of security, we maintain constant dialogue with the United States, and 
work on changing the quality of our relations with NATO.34  
 
                                                          
31 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 64-66. 
32 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 170. 
33 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 89-90, 97, 166. 
34 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly,” Moscow, Russia, April 18, 2002, accessed May 
17, 2017, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21567.  
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According to this statement, Russia is an advanced industrial country that has a place in Western 
coalitions without giving up its own historical traditions. Putin then further emphasizes a “belief 
in Russia’s greatness,” “social solidarity,” and “patriotism” as “foothold(s) for the unity of 
Russian society,” and in doing so he “was filling the psychological need to assert Russia’s 
distinctiveness from other, lesser, European countries.”35  
 How said strategies are applied is contingent on the dominating self-image’s 
ingroups and outgroups. Whether a group is perceived as an ingroup or an outgroup depends 
on if there are shared ties to a specific social category or not according to the national self.36 
Thus, in the statist mindset the West is an ingroup due to its technological and economic 
advancement and its status as a great power. Conversely, historically and culturally, Russia 
diverges so much from the West that it will never be seen as anything more than a partial 
ingroup for statist developmentalists.37 With this in mind, Clunan theorizes that cooperation 
will be sought for on the dimensions that unite Russia with the West, hence on the ingroup 
dimensions. This will then restrain competition and confrontation on the outgroup dimensions. 
However, the FSU is a complete ingroup, and since a “foreign state’s attitude toward the 
Russian population and Russian heritage is the most important criterion for Russia in 
determining whether a given state is friendly,” it is probable that if there would be a conflict 
between Russia and the West it would be because Russia experiences confrontation, threat, or 
competition regarding its status within the FSU ingroup.38  
 Above-mentioned absence of a political purpose, lack of understanding regarding 
humanitarian intervention, and perceived great power status based on historical grounds could 
be why Russia’s political elite came to see European security as merely the effects NATO and 
its expansion had on Russia. Not only was it perceived as isolating Russia from the West and 
its institutions, a crucial part in the ultimate goal of becoming an independent great power, but 
it also threatened its position among the former Soviet republics. Thus, the West and NATO 
posed a threat whilst being required in order to restore great power status and national self-
esteem. This resulted in that Russia’s foreign policy toward the West alternated between being 
competitive and cooperative.39 Besides, Russia’s desire to be a great power might require some 
                                                          
35 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 92-93. 
36 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 76. 
37 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 79. 
38 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 95-96. 
39 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 146-147, 153. 
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assimilation to the West but this is sought to be accomplished without being seen as a secondary 
partner to the former.40  
  
3.0 METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE  
To analyze the foreign policy concept, we will use two different methodological tools: idea 
analysis and argument analysis. The word idea in this thesis is defined as it is in the work of 
Bergström & Boréus Textens mening och makt. It is seen as a well-developed and well-
grounded thought or collection of thoughts that are “characterized by a certain stability and 
continuity.” Such thoughts can be representative of how one believes that one should act in 
certain situations; in our case this would be how the political elite or even how Putin himself 
believes that the Russian state should act in respect to geopolitical conditions and national 
interests.41 
As seen above we have chosen to only define the concept of idea and not the 
concept of ideology. Social science experts, such as Terry Eagleton42, Herbert Tingsten43, and 
John Gerring44 have all discussed how ideology should be defined but nonetheless there has 
been little agreement on the matter which has left a lot of room for subjective interpretations.45 
This in itself creates a validity problem. Therefore this has chosen to avoid the problematic 
definitional issues that comes with ideology by only analyzing ideas. However, the previously 
described theory could supposedly be interpreted as a sort of ideology analysis in itself but that 
is not how it is interpreted in this thesis.  
The idea is to use the sort of idea analysis that Bergström and Boréus call a 
functional idea analysis, hence we will look for and describe ideas in general and how they are 
manifested in the foreign policy concept while simultaneously seeking to explain their origin 
and effect on Russian relations with the European Union.46 Functional idea analysis has, 
according to Evert Vedung, traditionally been defined as the functions of ideas in a historical, 
psychological or sociological context. Often scientists attempt to establish how the idea is 
effected by its environment. Thus, traditionally the focus has been on explaining the origin of 
ideas. However, this type of analysis is also highly useful in analyzing their consequences, 
                                                          
40 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 156. 
41 Göran Bergström and Kristina Boréus, Textens mening och makt: Metodbook i samhällsvetenskaplig text- och 
diskursanalys, (Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2012), 140. 
42 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: an introduction, (London and New York: Verso, 1991). 
43 Herbert Tingsten, Idékritik, (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1941). 
44 John Gerring, ”Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,” Political Research Quarterly 50 (4), July 8, 1997. 
45 Gerring, ”Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,” 964-965. 
46 Bergström and Boréus, Textens mening och makt, 146-147. 
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which in this thesis’ opinion makes it suitable to combine with the aspirational constructivist 
theory. This combination allows for an interesting and innovative analysis of identities’ effect 
on ideas and ideas’ effect on foreign policy. Hence, the origin of ideas in this thesis is based on 
the prevailing collective identity which is based on history, social psychology, and current 
political situations. However, according to Vedung, functional idea analysis is lacking in 
structure and precision.47 The analysis can thus be conducted in many different ways which 
leaves a lot of room for subjective interpretation. The critique is justified, however, the same 
goes for all types of idea analysis.48 Consequently, the author continuously needs to strive for 
objectivity to not create validity problems. Nonetheless, the method is still the most suitable 
tool for this thesis due to its flexibility and the innovative analytical approaches that this allows.  
Three categories or dimensions that are believed to be of the utmost importance 
in analyzing the Russian foreign policy have been selected. The dimensions include NATO, 
ethno-linguistics and economic interests. These will therefore make up the analysis’ 
subchapters. The categories are what Bergström and Boréus call dimensions which, in 
comparison to ideal types, are much less detailed. Because of this, the use of dimensions has 
been criticized to run the risk of being too general and unspecific but in this analysis, it is 
believed that using dimensions is the better option. That is due to the fact that during the creation 
of ideal types it is very probable that there would be either too many generalizations about 
Russian politics, economy, culture and NATO. Or the ideal types would end up being the result 
of the research itself, in which case it would not be an analytical tool. Hence, in order to steer 
clear of such issues this thesis will be utilizing dimensions.49 And thus following functional 
idea analysis as presented by Bergström and Boréus. 
 On top of that there will be fragments of argument analysis, which mainly will 
assert itself as helpful in analyzing the implied messages in the foreign policy concept. An 
argument analysis is first and foremost an attempt to “understand the reasoning process of the 
author.” This is done by finding out the specific aim or aims of the text, searching for arguments 
supporting or rejecting these aims, and lastly searching for the premise that the arguments rest 
upon. In addition, one can examine the quality, strength and validity of the argumentation but 
this thesis’ will not conduct such a search.50 Rather, the argument analysis will be contained to 
                                                          
47 Evert Vedung, ”Innehållslig och funktionell idéanalys,” Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, January 1974, accessed 
May 18, 2017, 9-10, http://gauss.stat.su.se/gu/sg/2012VT/btArgumentationsanalys.pdf.  
48 Bergström and Boréus, Textens mening och makt, 173. 
49 Bergström and Boréus, Textens mening och makt, 167. 
50 Jan Garret, ”Argument Analysis: The Basic Method,” February 16, 2004, accessed May 18, 2017, 
http://www.people.wku.edu/jan.garret/arganals.htm.  
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the reasoning process of the foreign policy concept. Since this is an analysis of a political 
document it is expected that it will be required to read between the lines, or search for the 
implied aims, arguments and premise. Because of this we will be using the Toulmin model 
which has a strong focus on the implied.51 
 The Toulmin model is based on three parameters which Stephen Toulmin calls 
claim (C), data (D), and warrant (W). These are equivalent to what we just referred to as the 
aim, argument, and premise.52 However, the warrant relays on what is implied by the data or 
argument, hence it serves an explanatory purpose. Such explanations may be obvious in its 
simplest forms but they may also be more complex and representative of the authors 
interpretation of the data’s connection to the claim. In those cases, it is necessary to apply what 
Toulmin calls qualifiers (Q) and conditions of rebuttal (R). He explains that Q indicates “the 
strength conferred by the warrant…[and] R indicates[-ing] circumstances in which the general 
authority of the warrant would have to be set aside.”53 Toulmin then problematizes the term 
warrant. What if the warrant itself is questioned? And what is it based on? To answer this, he 
adds another element which he calls backing (B). Backing is the underlying facts for the 
warrant, hence it is the foundation on which the explanation or warrant is built upon.54 This is 
what a Toulmin model argument analysis may look like: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
51 Bergström and Boréus, Textens mening och makt, 106-107, 113, 115-116, 133. 
52 Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, first published 
1958), accessed May 18, 2017, 89-92, http://johnnywalters.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/5/13358288/toulmin-the-
uses-of-argument_1.pdf.  
53 Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, 92-94. 
54 Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, 95-97. 
(B) Because, 
according to 
French law, any 
person born in the 
country 
automatically 
becomes a citizen. 
(C) Cornelia is a 
French citizen. 
(D) Cornelia was born 
in France. 
So, (Q) presumably, 
(R) Unless, she 
moved abroad and 
revoked her French 
citizenship/the part 
of France where she 
was born is 
currently the 
territory of another 
state/etc. 
(W) Since she was 
born in France, she 
should be a French 
citizen. 
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Argument analysis in general is problematized because of its reliance on interpretation, which 
can result in validity issues. Nevertheless, the issue is solved by providing sufficient backing.55 
Hence, the model is still seen as useful to this thesis and will utilize it because of its explanatory 
orientation and its relative openness for interpretation of the implied. However, there will not 
be a graphic representation of the results. Instead it is to be used as a tool aimed to facilitate the 
interpretation of the implied messages regarding the ideas uncovered by the functional idea 
analysis. As such, it will serve as a compliment to the later. 
 
4.0 DISCUSSION OF THE MATERIAL AND ITS MODERN-HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND 
4.1 Outline of the material 
The document that is of analytical importance in this thesis is called Foreign Policy Concept of 
the Russian Federation and was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation on the 1st of December, 2016. This official document was also signed by the 
President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, on the 30th of November, 2016, which makes it 
representative of Russia’s official and legal standpoint on foreign policy and as such it is 
representative of the state’s security policy and priorities too.56  
 Being demonstrative of the Russian Federation’s principles, priorities and goals 
within foreign policy, this 27-page document is in line with the state’s constitution, principles 
and rules of international law, the state’s National Security strategy, their Military Doctrine, 
and much more. Accordingly, it is expected to safeguard the nation’s territory, national 
sovereignty and security, and to enhance lawful ruling and democratic institutions.  
The document also shows a strive for parity in its relationships and collaborations 
with other states, and a desire to improve the manner that other states view Russian media, 
culture and language. There is also a wish for international a recognition of its historical legacy, 
as well as reinforcement of the Federation’s influential capacity on the global community while 
simultaneously pursuing friendly relations with most states.  
Moreover, there is a clear desire to create a stable economic growth by, among 
other things, impeding discrimination towards Russian trade. Hence, there is an aspiration for 
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the global community to view Russia more positively in terms of economics and trade. With 
this urge to improve economic standards come the wish to pursue technological modernization, 
and with the wish for parity, the wish to be seen in a more positive light, and the desire of 
recognition of its historical legacy, comes the aspiration of playing a major role in peace-
keeping.57  
 
4.2 Post-Soviet foreign politics: a historical overview 
As argued in the theory chapter of this thesis, several national self-images were in competition 
with each other during the post-soviet era and were therefore unable to decide on a political 
purpose. Due to this inability, the main characteristic of post-Soviet foreign policy was, in 
general, attempts to regain Russia’s great power status in global economics and politics. 
Previously, the statist developmentalist identity was explained while excluding other national 
self-images, such as the Western one that indeed was a strong contender during the Yeltsin 
administration and somewhat noticeable during the Medvedev administration. However, under 
Putin’s leadership, statist developmentalism came to be the national identity and therefore we 
will concentrate on foreign policy under Putin’s current administration and the Putin 
administration, 2000 to 2008, whilst also incorporating a rough overview of the Yeltsin 
administration, 1991 to 1999. 
 
4.2.1 The Yeltsin administration, 1991 - 1999 
Boris Yeltsin was during his administration, according to the aspirational costructivist theory, 
representative of the Western self-image in post-soviet Russia. In short, this national self-image 
advocates assimilation into the West by abandoning Russian traditions as well as seeing its 
historical past as a negative factor unworthy of upholding. It seeks inclusion into Western 
institutions and favors democracy and the adoption of a Western political purpose.58 
Yeltsin fit into this category on an ideological spectrum as he decided to initiate 
a market transition in order to turn the planned economy into a Western market economy. This 
later became known as a shock therapy. The whole system was to change more or less over-
night. He did this by contracting Western experts and relying on Western aid. One of these 
experts, Jeffrey Sachs, explains the strategy as “a quick pricing liberalization, a quick move to 
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convertibility of the ruble, and a quick process of privatization.” However, due to this 
liberalization the general public could no longer afford basic goods.  
Yeltsin went on to appointing Anatolii Chubais as the man in charge of the 
privatization of the country’s companies. A voucher system was created. These vouchers were 
then given to all Russians so that they later could trade them for stocks, however, many were 
unaware of the potential value of these stocks and the system ended up serving only a select 
few oligarchs. This resulted in a significant decrease in popularity for Yeltsin, which then 
caused him to take action in questionable ways, contrary to the democratic system he claimed 
to represent. Among other things, he prolonged his right to rule by decree, he decided to dissolve 
the parliament and even ended up assembling tanks to shoot down the parliament building 
which resulted in over a hundred deaths.59 He also implemented “loans-for-shares;” a system 
that allowed oligarchs to purchase national assets, and to top it off, Yeltsin decided to accept a 
10-billion-dollar loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which further strengthened 
the rising public opinion that Russia was too dependent on the West. Russia was not fulfilling 
the wish for parity with the West, hence neglecting Russia’s great power status, which 
according to Clunan was a big reason for Russia’s low national self-esteem.60 
 
4.2.2 The Putin administration, 2000 – 2008  
Vladimir Putin, the previous head of security, was appointed as president in March, 2000. This 
caused Russian politics to take a completely different direction than what was preferred by the 
Yeltsin regime and other Westernizers. Namely, this was the start of statist developmentalism 
asserting itself as the country’s national identity. Putin began by increasing the state’s power, 
hence making it more centralized, and creating economic reforms that helped stabilize the 
Russian economy along with the rise of oil and gas prices. During those 8 years, the BNP 
doubled, wages tripled, and external trade increased dramatically.61  
 Putin saw Russia as a weak state, a state that had lost its glory, but a state that, 
nonetheless, deserved and was meant to have a place in the great power group.62 The country 
was humiliated and “jeopardized by plotters and revolutionaries.”63 Russia was as such 
                                                          
59, “Att skapa en Putin”, (SVT Play: Dokument Utifrån, December 11, 2016), accessed March 20, 2017, 
http://www.svtplay.se/video/11428622/att-skapa-en-putin/dokument-utifran-att-skapa-en-putin-att-skapa-en-
putin?info=visa. 
60 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence, 119. 
61 Örjan Berner, Härskarna i Kreml: Från Gorbatjov till Putin, (Falun: Bonniers, 2014), 391-392. 
62 Aglaya Snetkov, Russia’s Security Policy under Putin: A critical perspective, (New York, USA and Milton 
Park, UK, 2015), 31-32, 36. 
63 Snetkov, Russia’s Security Policy under Putin, 35. 
16 
 
experiencing an all-time low self-esteem, a self-esteem that Putin wanted to rebuild. 
Considering this objective, both internal and external security, became of crucial significance. 
For this reason, any actor viewed as having the intention to exploit Russia in its weekend state 
was to be seen as a security risk or issue. Therefore, international terrorism became a key 
priority and the domestic events in Chechnya came to be seen as acts of terror or as existential 
threats against the Russian state.64 According to Putin, Russia, when they retreated from 
Chechnya in 1996, left the region in the hands of militants and fundamentalists from Middle 
Eastern armed groups causing both the Chechen and Russian population to be humiliated. 
According to the prevailing discourse at the time, this allowed Islamic terrorist groups to 
operate from within the region and therefore threatening Russian-Chechen socio-cultural 
traditions and effectively justifying Russian intervention.65 Russia’s following victory “was 
presented as a key stepping stone towards Russia asserting its sovereign rights over its territory, 
and regaining its status as a confident and strong domestic and international actor.”66 
As argued throughout the theory chapter and this background, the most important 
foreign policy objectives were economic and technologic modernization, international 
competitiveness and restoration of the state’s historical great power status. Where this greatness 
should come from was heavily debated. Should it come from further integration of the post-
Soviet republics, from its historical legacy, or from its energy resources and financial strength? 
The matter is discussed by Dimitri Trenin in an article from 2004.67 Statist developmentalism 
argues for an incorporation of all of the above which is also shown in present day events and in 
Putin’s foreign policy making. Russian aspirations for further integration of traditionally 
Eastern countries can, for example, be seen through their dependence on Russian oil and gas: 
in the case of Poland and Hungary, the nations’ dependence on Russian energy exports were in 
2006, 77% and 81% for oil respectively 58% and 72% for gas.68 This goes hand in hand with 
financial strength being a key ingredient in how to measure the power of the state. In addition, 
the Russian reaction to NATO’s expansions into post-Soviet territory, the 2003 Western 
invasion of Iraq69 and the Color Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgystan,70 
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demonstrated how important it was for Russia to be seen as being on the same status level as 
the Western great powers. Thus, being respected in international decisions, especially those that 
may violate Russian national interests.71 It also shows how Russia perceived Western meddling 
on its previous territory as “U.S. efforts to install anti-Russian forces and to isolate Russia from 
its own backyard”.72 The Iraq invasion, that progressed without consent from the UN Security 
Council, created a view of the West as being capable of ignoring international law as well as 
“the principle of sovereignty and multilateral global governance”73, and therefore contributing 
to the then and currently present Russian-Western tensions.  
 
4.2.3 The current Putin administration and contemporary political events 
After the 2012 elections when Putin was reappointed as president the regime’s ideological 
program took on a much more aggressive approach on patriotism and traditionalism than 
previously. In both his first and second cycles, Putin had connected his ideas of patriotism with 
progress and modernization, while in this third term he has seemed to be favoring making the 
connection between patriotism and protecting Russian values as well as focusing on the nations 
historical heritage as being “an independent and proud nation that function[s] beyond global 
developments and that does not bow down to the West.” However, this patriotism, in contrast 
to the one set by nationalist clusters such as the Moscow Defence League and the Russian Public 
Movement, was from the beginning distancing itself from ethnic patriotism, instead it centered 
on state patriotism. Nonetheless, the disputes over Crimea changed this tendency of the patriotic 
discourse.74 
 The Crimean conflict originated from President Yanukovich’s decision to turn 
down an EU Association agreement for Ukraine with the purpose of joining the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU). This was, in turn, met with massive protests and ended in his 
abdication from the presidential post. These protests were, by Russia, seen or at least depicted 
as not only illegal but also as a Western attempt to favor its own interests whilst undermining 
Russia’s position on what it believes is its own territory.75 Furthermore, Russia expressed its 
support for various separatist groups that were against the new government. Such groups often 
took aggressive measures by, for example, seizing governmental buildings “and declar[ing] 
independent authority of their towns, cities and region.” The annexation of Crimea also had 
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historical reasons going back as far as the 10th century when Prince Vladimir of Kiev 
successfully converted the population to Christianity giving the region symbolical value for 
Russian Christianity and identity. Moreover, Crimea had been used to assert Russian great 
power status when it was previously annexed by Catherine the Great.76 This in itself may have 
motivated Russia to send in military troops and contributed to the already increasing anti-
Western political discourse.77 
However, this does not mean that Russia does not have any interest in cooperating 
with the West. On the contrary, Russia seeks economic partnerships with Western countries.78 
This can be established since Russia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2012 and 
consequently eliminated trade barriers between the Russian state and the Western global 
market.79 The desire to trade with the EU is further ratified by the fact that trade value reached 
a record high that same year, 215.124 million Euros. Nevertheless, this trade value has been on 
a steady decline ever since then: decreasing to a value of 118.661 million Euros in 2016.80  
 
5.0 ANALYTICAL FINDINGS 
5.1 NATO 
After going through the “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” we have with the 
help of functional idea analysis found several references to NATO, both direct and implied. As 
Clunan theorized, Russia has a very negative view on NATO expansions into areas neighboring 
the Russian Federation. The claim is therefore that Russia wants to impede NATO’s 
expansions. The following examples are data that have been collected with the help of the 
Toulmin model which later is used to create warrants and backings. In this section there are no 
rebuttals due to that the claim is written in the foreign policy concept. 
In article 61, the data states that NATO and the West in general are the main 
reasons for the deteriorating Russian – Western relations. It is even stated that “the containment 
policy adopted by the United States and its allies against Russia…and other pressure Russia is 
facing from them undermine regional and global stability…and run counter to the growing need 
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for cooperation and addressing transnational challenges and threats in today’s world.”81 From 
Clunan’s, Shevchenko’s and Larson’s perspective this could be seen as Russia using a creative 
strategy in order to set itself apart from the West. A warrant could thus be: Russia is, contrary 
to the West, open to cooperation in order to fight international terrorism. Hence, in this warrant 
Russia comes off as more responsible than the West, thus the creativity strategy. 
This statement is then strengthened by article 70 where the data says that Russia 
is willing to build a relationship with NATO, one that is based on mutual trust, predictability 
and transparency. In this thesis’s opinion, their demands for this to progress are indeed 
reasonable. For instance, both parties need to strictly follow “the norms and principles of 
international law” and both are to “refrain from seeking to ensure one’s security at the expense 
of the security of other States.” 82 Nonetheless, however reasonable this may appear there is 
room for much interpretation regarding this data. Other data in article 26c concludes that:  
 
[Russia is prepared to] prevent military interventions or other forms of outside 
interference contrary to international law, specifically the principle of sovereign equality 
of States, under the pretext of implementing the “responsibility to protect” concept.83  
 
A warrant for this could be: Russia wishes to impede NATO’s expansions because it breaks 
international law. Prior to this statement, in article 26b, Russia also claims that it will counter 
other states’ “attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs of States with the aim of 
unconstitutional change of regime, including by supporting non-State actors, such as terrorist 
and extremist groups.”84 With this pretext in mind it is highly plausible that Russia is referring 
to the Crimea conflict. As explained, Russia saw the overthrowing of ex-president Yanukovich 
as a result of EU attempts to favor its own interests and therefore a breach of international law, 
which in itself serves as a backing. The functional idea analysis has therefore proved itself 
useful due to its focus on origin and environmental influences on ideas. Another backing for 
Russia is that, according to them, the EU was supporting an “unconstitutional change of regime” 
and non-State actors or extremist groups. However, the Russian Federation later military 
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intervened in Ukraine, itself supporting extremist groups on the other end of the spectrum, 
effectively breaking international law itself. Who is right or wrong in this issue is not a subject 
that will be covered by this thesis, however, the examples show how differently international 
law has been interpreted by Russia in comparison to its Western counterparts. Furthermore, it 
exemplifies the creative strategy explained by Clunan. 
As Clunan expected, Western meddling with FSU states is one of the likeliest 
causes of a major conflict with Russia and this is clearly stated in article 70:  
 
The Russian Federation maintains its negative perspective towards NATO’s expansion, 
the Alliance’s military infrastructure approaching Russian borders, and its growing 
military activity in regions neighbouring Russia, viewing them as… [the cause for the] 
deepening of old dividing lines in Europe and to the emergence of new ones.85 
 
This data makes our established claim seem unnegotiable to Russia if there is to be any Western 
– Russian cooperation on security matters. During the Yeltsin administration, there were quite 
a few theories regarding how NATO’s eastern expansion would affect the West’s relationship 
with Russia. Among intellectuals it was for example thought that Russia would turn to China 
for military cooperation and that its nuclear weapons would fall into the wrong hands. It was 
even said by ex-Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais, that NATO’s expansion “would force 
Moscow to reappraise its policy of co-operation with the West, [and] threaten to trigger a fresh 
arms race.”86  
However, although Russia has been taking on a more aggressive approach toward 
the West and although it has been expanding its cooperation with the East in general, there is 
still a clear wish for friendly relations with the West as shown by previous statements. The 
reason for this, according to Clunan’s theory, is that Russia still is rebuilding its self-esteem 
since the fall of the Soviet Union. To do that Russia’s political elite had to decide on a common 
political purpose, either follow a unique Russian path or adopt Western principles. Unable to 
decide, Russia’s history as a great power created a consensus on its rightful superpower status 
today, and this had to serve as a stand-in for a political purpose. This inability to choose between 
adaptation to the West or creation of a unique Russian path is also made very visible in the 
document as Russia first claims that: 
                                                          
85 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ”Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation,” article 70. 
86 Lilly A. Lo Manto, ”NATO Looks East: A Realist Reassessment,” Glendon Journal of International Studies 
(Vol. 3., 2003), file:///C:/Users/namn/Downloads/35217-37761-1-SM.pdf, 105-106. 
21 
 
 
The Russian Federation is committed to maintaining intensive and mutually beneficial 
dialogue with the EU on key items on the foreign policy agenda, as well as further 
promoting practical cooperation on foreign policy, military and political issues. There is 
potential for Russia and the EU to step up combined efforts...87 
 
Here there is an obvious wish to cooperate with the EU, and so with the West. This goes hand 
in hand with article 72: 
 
The Russian Federation is interested in building mutually beneficial relations with the 
United States of America, taking into consideration that the two States bear special 
responsibility for global strategic stability and international security in general…88 
 
As previously theorized, Russia has placed itself in the great power group. It seeks parity with 
the United States in order to rebuild self-esteem and to modernize both technologically and 
economically. The previous two are both pro-western statements. However, they are then 
countered by article 84: 
 
…Russia intends to promote foreign policy cooperation with China in various areas, 
including countering new challenges and threats, resolving urgent regional and global 
problems, cooperation in international organizations and multilateral associations.89 
 
The statements serve as data since they are reasons supporting the claim. A warrant could thus 
be: With a lesser NATO involvement Russia is willing to cooperate and without it they will 
have no choice but to expand to the East. The warrant can be strengthened by the backing: 
Russia intends to expand and strengthen its Eastern partnerships with, among others, India, 
Mongolia, Japan, Iran and of course with the members of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)90 and the Commonwealth of 
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Independent States (CIS)91. Hence, there is no doubt that Russia has turned to the East for both 
military and other forms of cooperation and it is very likely that this is due to experienced 
hostility from the West and NATO’s expansions. However, we have also seen that the West is 
a priority for Russia. This goes in line with the aspirational constructivist theory regarding 
statist developmentalism, namely, that for them the West is a partial ingroup and therefore 
unlikely to experience a real threat from Russia. 
 Lastly, this document was written when negotiations on the NATO annexation of 
Montenegro had already started.92 An issue that itself could be debated. However, although 
continued NATO expansions Russia still states that “…a large scale war, including nuclear war, 
between major powers remains unlikely… [however, there is] an increased risk of being drawn 
into regional conflicts and escalating crises.”93 This is also in line with the developmentalist 
identity which considers the West an ingroup on many accounts and will therefore try to avoid 
serious confrontation with the West. However, the FSU states are a greater ingroup to Russia 
and therefore conflicts are still to be expected in this area. As such, Bergström’s and Boréus’s 
definition of dimensions and Vedung’s explanation of functional idea analysis, gave this thesis 
the foundation it needed in order to discuss the idea of NATO in the foreign policy document. 
Additionally, Toulmin’s argument analysis has allowed it to turn implied messages in the 
foreign policy concept into a concrete idea with solid data, warrants and backings, supporting 
the idea’s claim. Clunan’s aspirational constructivism then aided in the explanatory process of 
the origin and consequences of these ideas. 
 
5.2 The ethno-linguistic dimension  
How is the ethno-linguistic dimension portrayed in Russia’s foreign policy concept? As 
theorized by aspirational constructivism, the Russian language, culture and history are some of 
the most important things to preserve and promote in the statist developmentalist world view. 
The first reference to the ethno-linguistic dimension is in article 3h-i. Here, Russia expresses a 
desire to strengthen its “role in international culture” by promoting the Russian language and 
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so increase its world status, create more awareness globally regarding Russia’s historical 
legacy, cultural identity and cultural achievements.94  
The consolidation of the Russian diaspora is another important subject. In other 
words, to bring together all Russians. Whether that is ethnic Russians, cultural Russians or 
simply Russian speakers is not mentioned in the document but it is not farfetched to assume 
that it implies all three categories due to the statist developmentalist mindset regarding 
citizenship. As explained, for them citizenship is defined by loyalty to the state along with 
adaption to the Russian language and culture. All of the above contributes this thesis’s claim: 
Russia has expansionist aspirations and intends to increase their sphere of indirect influence. 
 Consolidation could mean anything between simply promoting the Russian 
language, culture and history among Russian’s residing abroad to bringing all Russian’s back 
to Russia. The document aims to support “compatriots living abroad so as to enable them to 
better realize their rights in the countries of residence, and to facilitate the preservation of the 
Russian diaspora’s identity and its ties with the historical homeland, as well as voluntary 
relocation of compatriots to the Russian Federation.”95 This data therefore supports Clunan’s 
idea that statist developmentalists highly prioritize the Russian history, language and culture. 
In general, the document is very protective and supportive of Russian’s living abroad, which 
they call compatriots, and applauds their contribution to “preserving and promoting the Russian 
language and culture.”96  
In the view of this thesis, the Russian interest in spreading their language does not 
stop at simply increasing the general knowledge about it. With data such as “the learning and 
wider use of the Russian language… [is] an integral part of the global culture and…[is] an 
instrument of international and inter-ethnic communication,”97 it cannot be helped but to 
compare it with the usage of the English language today. Utilizing an origin orientated 
functional idea analysis and aspirational constructivism, this thesis argues that Russia places 
itself on the same level as the United States and therefore wishes for their language and culture 
to be as widely spread across the globe. This also serves as a warrant. As in many other areas 
of the foreign policy there seems to be a perception of the West as the definition of great power. 
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Russia with its great power aspirations may therefore have adapted to and sometimes copied 
Western concepts whilst claiming to have a unique approach. As exemplified, these concepts 
do not only contain economics and technology, but also language and cultural status. The 
Toulmin model helps establish the warrant: Russia intends to spread its language and culture 
to increase its sphere of influence, and the backing: Because of Russia’s great power aspirations 
and strive for parity with the U.S. it wishes to spread its language and culture. 
 Within the realm of the consequence orientated functional idea analysis, the idea 
to consolidate the Russian diaspora creates an interest in how Russia desires to integrate former 
FSU states. These states are today called Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan. Of course, this thesis will not cover all of these countries, instead it will give 
examples of Belarus and Ukraine due to that they are specifically mentioned in the document 
and not merely in groups such as the CIS. Nonetheless, to give an overview of the general 
integration process of the FSU states the following statement about the CIS is presented. In 
article 49 the data suggests that Russia seeks deeper integration with the CIS in general, which 
consists of all of the above except the Baltic states.  
 
The foreign policy priorities of the Russian Federation include developing bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation with member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and further strengthening integration structures within the CIS involving Russia.98 
 
With this data, another warrant can be created: Russia seeks to increase its sphere of influence 
by strengthening integration with the CIS. The matter is further developed in the data of article 
50 with a reference to Belarus which states that “Russia is committed to expanding strategic 
cooperation with the Republic of Belarus…with a view to promoting integration in all areas.”99 
Whether such deep integration is in Belarus’s best interest or if it even is something that Belarus 
is in favor of will not be researched in this thesis but it is definitely a subject of interest for 
future research. Nonetheless, one can sense an expansionist tendency in these statements which 
is consistent with the statist developmentalist desire to integrate FSU states under Russian 
hegemony. It creates the basis for the warrant: Russia desires to increase its sphere of influence 
by promoting integration in all areas with Belarus. It also provides us with the backing: Due to 
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Russia’s history as a great power and its prevailing national identity it seeks to increase its 
sphere of influence by various means. 
 Russian 21st century expansionism is a term that has been encountered several 
times during the research process of this thesis. Several articles and larger academic works refer 
to this matter, of which a few of them are to be referenced here. In this context, expansionism 
should be understood as “a process allowing a dominant country to have indirect control over 
the sovereignty of other states.” That is how Russian expansionism is defined by Yale 
University and this thesis agrees. The same article clams that Russia’s foreign policy is applying 
a “seven-stage trajectory of policies” in order to fulfill its expansionist goals. As this analysis 
has noticed as well, there is a very Western usage of soft power regarding humanitarian policies. 
The article then claims that “[t]his proceeds to information warfare; “passportization,” which 
hands out Russian citizenship and passports to compatriots abroad; calls for compatriot 
protection, which can eventually result in annexation of territories.” The article then claims that 
Russia’s goal with this is to “achieve territorial expansion under the guise of compatriot or 
minority protection.”100 Whether this is the ultimate goal of Russian foreign policy or not can 
only be theorized and remains to be seen in future events. However, with regard to the statist 
developmentalist view on integration of FSU states and aspirational constructivism establishing 
the Russian aspiration of regaining historical power, it is a possible outcome. Hence, by 
examining the surroundings of the expansionist idea, this functional idea analysis has found a 
clear example of how an idea can influence its environment. 
 This expansionism is supported by the aforementioned “passportization” and the 
foreign policy concept’s clearly expressed effort to “delimitate the state boundary of the 
Russian Federation as well as its maritime boundaries, within which Russia exercises its 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction…”101 Combining Vedung’s functional idea analysis with this 
data enable this thesis to conclude that Russia is intending to create new boundaries which will 
strengthen their influence on surrounding states and directly influence relations with the EU. 
 “Passportization,” or the act of handing out passports in foreign territory while 
simultaneously claiming to be protecting its citizens, is a method that has been applied by 
Russia several times during the 21st century. To clarify, the term citizen here refers to the statist 
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developmentalist definition of the term. For example, according to Putins former adviser Andrei 
Illarionov: 
 
Following the Adjara crisis, Moscow further ratcheted up tension with Tblisi by 
expanding Russian military and administrative control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
and accelerating the distribution of Russian passports in the two territories. Henceforth it 
could rationalize its actions in these two regions by the claim that it was merely defending 
its “citizens.”102 
 
This fact can in itself serve as a backing to several of the previously established warrants. As 
these states belong to Georgia there is definitely reason to believe that the Russian foreign 
policy contains expansionist tendencies. A very similar event took place in Ukraine when 
Ukrainian separatist movements handed out Russian passports. Although there is no proof that 
these passports were handed out on governmental order, Russia still decided to accept the 
documents as valid for the time being. This thesis considers that as being an effect of that 
citizenship is defined by one’s loyalty to the state. Thus, Vedung’s, Bergström’s and Boréus’s 
view on functional idea analysis may consider this as the effect of an expansionist idea rooted 
in statist developmentalism. However, it may also be used as a rebuttal: EU involvement in 
Ukraine started the war which forced Russia to protect its compatriots residing abroad. 
 Russia’s expansionism into Ukraine is further backed up by humanitarian 
obligations103 in article 56, which this thesis also deems to be a rebuttal: 
 
[The] Russian Federation is interested in developing political, economic, cultural and 
spiritual ties with Ukraine in all areas on the basis of mutual respect and commitment to 
building partnership relations with due regard for Russia’s national interests. Russia 
undertakes to make every effort to promote political and diplomatic settlement of the 
internal conflict in Ukraine...104 
 
As pointed out by Clunan’s theory, statist developmentalists sees Ukraine as an important 
community to integrate economically because of their developed military and industrial 
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infrastructure and because of the large portion of Russian speakers on Crimea. These factors, 
along with the historical reasons previously presented, are in the view of this functional idea 
analysis all important motives as to why Russia wanted to annex the region.  
Considering the above quote and the previously established facts regarding 
“passportization” and delimitation of Russian borders, this thesis believes it is fair to say that 
Russia is practicing a sort of imperialism over the FSU states and that aspirational 
constructivism has been correct in applying the statist developmentalist national identity on the 
Putin administration. With the help of argument analysis and functional idea analysis this thesis 
has examined the ethno-linguistic dimension and the ideas it contains by researching the 
political environment and excavating the claim, data, warrants, and rebuttals of the foreign 
policy concept.  
 
5.3 Economic interests 
Just like Clunan expected, Putin’s statist developmentalist administration seeks to boost the 
economy in order to make it more competitive internationally and to encourage technological 
modernization.105 However, this growth seems to rely less and less on cooperation with the 
West, instead, there has been a clear eastern economic expansion, which is noticeable both in 
foreign policy statements and in actual World Trade Organization (WTO) numbers, showing 
the value of EU-Russian trade. Therefore, this thesis’ claim is: Russia strives for an economic 
expansion to the East. This switch is mentioned in article 4: 
 
The world is currently going through fundamental changes related to the emergence of a 
multipolar international system…Globalization has led to the formation of new centers 
of economic and political power. Global power and development potential is becoming 
decentralized, and is shifting towards the Asia-Pacific Region, eroding the global 
economic and political dominance of the traditional western powers.106 
 
This data is later followed up by several more specific descriptions and goals of expanding the 
Asia – Pacific economic cooperation. With Vedung’s explanation of functional idea analysis in 
mind, it is appropriate to examine the consequences this economic idea has had on its 
environment. Hence, referring to the background chapter, some of the consequences becomes 
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clear. In 2012, when Russia first joined the WTO, the Russian trade value with the EU reached 
a record high. In 2016, however, the economic switch became visible and the trade value only 
amounted to slightly more than half of that. EU sanctions on Russia following the Ukraine 
conflict, EU attempts to decrease its dependence on Russian energy,107 Western intervention in 
the FSU, increasing anti-Western discourse and the Russian aspiration of being an independent 
superpower may all have been contributing to this decline in trade. Furthermore, the eastern 
market expansion is evident in the creation of the EAEU in 2015, which is a Russian led free 
trade union between Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz republic.108 This is a 
growing trade union and it is, along with the growing Russian – Chinese relations, 
representative of Russia’s Eastern market expansion and may in itself in part be what is causing 
the decline in Western – Russian trade. 
 The fact that the union is expanding can also be proven by looking at what is 
expressed in the foreign policy concept. Article 51 states that Russia considers it a key objective 
to expand and strengthen integration within the EAEU. This is hoped to fulfill statist 
developmentalist goals such as “comprehensive technological modernization” and economic 
competitiveness. As aspirational constructivism also expects from statist developmentalism, 
this economic competitiveness is inspired from Western models, in other words the EAEU is 
intended to “ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital and workforce, and offer a 
platform for implementing joint infrastructure and investment projects.”109 This data 
demonstrates that statist developmentalists are in favor of applying Western economic models 
and that they intend to continue the eastern economic expansion. 
 In the foreign policy concept the Russian state expresses a desire to tap into new 
markets, to “expand [its] presence on the global markets” by “diversifying its exports” and to 
“gain a larger foothold in traditional… [markets]” as well as to counter all discrimination 
against Russian exporters and investors.110 The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) 
defines such traditional markets, or at least the most profitable exports in 2015, as Crude 
Petroleum ($90.1B), Refined Petroleum ($57.5B) and Petroleum Gas ($25.4B).111 In 
                                                          
107 Kennet Rapoza, “Europe Devises Energy Security Measures to Reduce Russia Dependence”, Forbes, 
February 9, 2016, accessed March 27, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/02/09/europe-
devises-energy-security-measures-to-reduce-russia-dependence/#3f012724235c.  
108 Eurasian Economic Union, ”About the Union”, accessed March 27, 2017, 
http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about.  
109 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ”Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation,” article 51. 
110 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ”Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation,” article 40c-d. 
111 ”Russia,” OEC, accessed April 28, 2017, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/rus/#Exports.  
29 
 
accordance, the data tells us that Russia wishes to “enhance cooperation with the leading energy 
producers” and to take advantage of “its unique geographic location by increasing transit cargo 
shipments with a view to facilitating the development of trade and economic relations between 
Europe and the Asia – Pacific region.”112 As shown in the background chapter, many countries, 
especially eastern European states, are already highly dependent on Russian oil and gas. Even 
so, Russia attempts to expand its energy exports to new states as well as to enhance the 
dependence on Russian oil and gas in states that already are big importers. All of the data 
supports the claim. In continuation, it is therefore possible to create warrants and backings. For 
example, one warrant could be: Russia’s eastern economic expansion is visible in the state’s 
rising focus on increasing its presence in its traditional markets by, among other things, 
facilitating trade in the Asia – Pacific region. The backing would in this case be: Russia’s 
traditional markets are oil and gas exports and in order to increase their energy exports in the 
Asia – Pacific region they will have to build more pipelines heading to the East.  
 The fact that in 2015, Russia envisaged that by 2020 about 30% of crude oil 
exports and 15% of gas exports should be heading to Asia and that by 2035 about 36-39% of 
its total energy exports should be heading to the Asia – Pacific region, is in itself a backing to 
the warrant.113 An effect of this is the construction of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline that is 
expected to be completed by 2018, which effectively is fulfilling the goal to connect the 
European market with the Asia – Pacific one while simultaneously lessening Russian 
dependence on energy exports to Europe. A factor that was troublesome for Russia during the 
EU sanctions in relation to the Ukraine conflict.114 The tensions between Europe and Russia 
may have inspired other pipeline constructions as well, for example, Russia is currently 
planning to commence the construction of a pipeline heading to India who is one of the world’s 
principal consumers of oil,115 as well as a pipeline between Russia and Japan which is currently 
being negotiated.116 Hence, the functional idea analysis has again shown how the idea of 
regaining historical power is manifested in current events and in the foreign policy concept. 
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However, it is possible to add a rebuttal here: Russia only seems to be expanding its eastern 
markets because of Western sanctions. However, the previously analyzed expansionist 
tendency disagrees. 
 These Asia-Pacific expansions does not automatically mean that Russia does not 
have any interest in energy exports to the EU, rather this thesis deems that it is a way of gaining 
independence from Western powers and that way increase its negotiation power and great 
power status. For instance, there are currently plans revolving the construction of a natural gas 
line called Nord Stream 2 through the Baltic Sea which according to the general description of 
the project is to secure the EU’s need of additional gas imports.117  
Toulmin’s argument analysis model combined with Vedung’s definition of 
functional idea analysis have allowed this thesis to interpret the meaning of the data by applying 
significant information on the events surrounding the analyzed dimension. This together with 
Clunan’s aspirational constructivism has allowed it to draw some plausible conclusions 
regarding the dimension’s effects on the EU, a subject that will be discussed in the coming 
chapter. The conclusions are solely based on aspirational constructivism and this thesis’s 
analysis of the foreign policy concept and can therefore not be seen as concrete answers. Rather 
they are simply possibilities. 
 
6.0 ANALYTICAL DISCUSSION 
So, what does the Russian foreign policy concept mean for the European Union? There are 
many answers to this question since it affects a number of areas. However, in this chapter we 
will contain ourselves to discuss aspects of the following open sub-questions, which are all 
related to the sub-chapters of the analysis and to a consequence orientated functional idea 
analysis: Is it likely that Russia will wage war against the EU? How might Russian expansionist 
tendencies affect the EU? And, what may Russia’s Eastern economic expansion mean for the 
EU? 
 During quite a number of years newspapers have been publishing articles that 
would suggest Russian aggression towards the West. This has not changed and lately there have 
been articles that suggest ‘a new cold war era’ or that Russia is preparing itself for a large-scale 
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war or even a nuclear war according to Independent.118 The Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet 
published a similar article earlier this year, claiming that Russia is preparing itself for large-
scale warfare. The suspicion arises not only from the increasing amount of military practice 
operations but also from the amount of money being spent on the up-building of the military. 
Russia is currently spending around 5,4 % out of their BNP on the military while the U.S. 
spends around 3.3% and China 2%. For statist developmentalists a great power has to have a 
good economy, be technologically modern and have military power that is on par with the most 
powerful of states. The article in Aftonbladet even states that currently only NATO and China 
can match Russia in military capacity. 119 However, since we have established that the West 
continues to be a partial ingroup for Russia and that Russia therefore does not wish for 
confrontation with the West, this thesis concludes that a large-scale military confrontation is 
improbable. Based on the data presented in the analytical chapter, the most likely confrontation 
is alleged to be over NATO’s expansions into countries neighboring Russia since this is 
perceived as a threat to national security. Due to that and to the expansionist tendency, it is 
believed that there may be continued conflicts or even wars in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, 
this thesis deems that a full-scale war between NATO and Russia or the EU and Russia as an 
unlikely outcome. 
 This belief is not only strengthened by the official foreign policy concept but also 
by the Russian reaction to continued NATO expansions, the last one being the accession of 
Montenegro. In response to these expansions the Russian senator Klintsevich said that Russia 
“will aim… [their] weapons, including the nuclear ones, at any of the alliance’s site that would 
threaten…[them], wherever these sites are placed.” Notwithstanding, as press secretary Dimitry 
Peskov claimed, Russian “lawmakers cannot determine the country’s foreign policy.”120 And 
so far, there has been no official response that would suggest a large-scale war or nuclear attack. 
Hence, the West as a partial ingroup continues to be an immense inspiration for Russia to avoid 
a large-scale war. Notwithstanding, their foreign policy concept states that these expansions are 
“deepening old dividing lines in Europe and… [that they are contributing] to the emergence of 
new ones.” Even so, due to the warrants and backings of the data presented in the analysis and 
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because of the actual response to NATO’s expansions, this thesis deems that Russia will avoid 
war with NATO as much as possible. However, that does not mean that no countermeasures 
will be taken. Whatever form these countermeasures will take is not a subject of investigation 
here but we do believe that it will not be in the form of a large-scale or nuclear war.  
 So, how might Russian expansionist tendencies affect the EU? Russian 
expansionism in the foreign policy concept is presented in the form of integration and protection 
of minorities, the Russian diaspora, and human rights in general. The integration is sometimes 
sought for in all areas, and other times, in economic and military areas. However, as we have 
seen, many theorize that this will expand into accession of territory through means such as 
“passportization,” as it already has in Ossetia, Abkhazia and Ukraine. “Passportization” gives 
Russia a reason to be overinvolved in other states affairs by arguing that they are simply 
protecting the rights of Russian citizens. This interpretation is based on Toulmin’s argument 
analysis which has allowed us to interpret the connections between the data and the claim. In 
addition, the interpretation is in itself built on Vedung’s functional idea analysis which allows 
for the ideas or dimensions to be put into a greater context.  
 As predicted by Clunan’s aspirational constructivism the Russian language and 
culture is of great importance when it comes to how it justifies annexing, integrating or 
influencing foreign territories. This is further supported by the desire to regain historical power 
and self-esteem. In the foreign policy concept this is clearly manifested in claims regarding 
continued work for delimitating Russia’s outer territories. In the document, there is mainly a 
focus on terrestrial borders as well as marine borders, but in the light of both recent and older 
events this thesis deems it likely that this delimitation goes for airspace as well. Such events are 
among other, the previous and continued intrusion of Swedish airspace and the more recent 
provocation very close to American airspace.121 
 The expansionist tendency will, according to this thesis, have the most effect on 
Eastern European countries who are not part of NATO. Our functional idea analysis has focused 
on the events surrounding its claim and has observed that Russia does not pursue integration 
with NATO members nor has there been a war between Russia and any of the states in the 
alliance. Hence, if a state is part of the EU, Russia will most likely refrain from overinvolvement 
due to that the state then constitutes a part of what is perceived as the West. This could cause 
conflict, which Clunan deems that Russia prefers to avoid. Nonetheless, if NATO continues its 
eastern expansion into states that are perceived as particularly important to Russia, there is, 
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according to the analysis, a risk that Russia either will intervene militarily claiming that they 
are protecting Russian citizens and their rights, or that other countermeasures will be taken. For 
example, it could have economic effects. Hence, our functional idea analysis concludes that the 
states who are of integration interest to Russia and that desire to join NATO or the EU are more 
likely to be exposed to military interventions or internal conflicts. Nevertheless, a World War 
III remains highly unlikely. 
 Thus, how will Russia’s eastern economic expansion affect the EU? In 2014, the 
EU economic sanctions on Russia and Russia’s counter-sanctions were heavily discussed in the 
media. It is this thesis belief that the eastern economic expansion that we see today and the 
decreasing Russia – EU trade is, at least in part, an effect of these sanctions. This result was 
also manifested in a study by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research.122 However, there 
is other research that suggests that the decreasing trade between the EU and Russia mainly is 
due to the recension in Russia and not due to the sanctions on either side. According to that 
study, it is extremely difficult to measure the impact of the sanctions because they coincided 
with the Russian recession and its falling oil prices.123 Nevertheless, with the help of the foreign 
policy concept we can establish that Russia wishes for the sanctions to come to a halt. This can 
be seen in the previously analyzed data, such as 3d and 40d, stating that Russia intends to work 
against discrimination of Russian investments, investors, exporters, services and goods. Other 
data, such as article 12, claims that “the technological shift that is beginning to take shape in 
various economic sectors may further escalate economic competition, accelerating the 
redistribution of power on the international arena.”124 Applying the ideas of Vedung and 
Toulmin this might imply that the sanctions are at least provoking Russia and is at least in part 
responsible for the eastern economic expansion on the Russian side.  
  However, Russian counter-sanctions on the EU are largely negligible for 
economies such as the UK, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany and others. 125 All in all, the 
counter-sanctions are taking the most toll on the Baltic and Eastern European states due to the 
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difficulty they have experienced in finding alternative markets.126 This thesis deems that such 
an uneven effect was more than a mere coincidence, rather it believes it to be likely that Russia 
who is aware of the economic state of these countries chose to enforce sanctions that they knew 
would give them the most trouble. As aspirational constructivism theorizes, the countries who 
traditionally are seen as the West are an important part of rebuilding the Russian post-soviet 
economy and its role as great power. However, the Baltic states, who traditionally may be 
viewed as eastern, are according to aspirational constructivism desired to be under Russian 
hegemony and their union with the West may as such be seen as undermining Russia’s historic 
role as a great power. Therefore, the counter-sanctions are likely to be a way of demonstrating 
Russia’s continued influential capacity on these states. The eastern expansion may indeed affect 
the EU but after extensive research the Russian economy still seem to be taking the hardest hit, 
which gives the EU leverage over Russia. It is therefore expected that Russia will continue to 
pursue profitable economic relations with the EU while simultaneously expanding its eastern 
market. 
 
7.0 CONCLUSION 
This thesis has with the help of aspirational constructivism, functional idea analysis and 
Toulmins argument analysis model, analyzed the Russian foreign policy concept. The 
methodological tools have allowed the thesis to interpret data and warrants by basing its 
backings on historical facts and current political events. It has shown how the present foreign 
policy concept is influenced by the state’s national identity, also called statist 
developmentalism. For statist developmentalism, the historical power of Russia plays a 
significant role in the state’s aspirations and therefore in its national interests.  
The analysis then investigated the dimensions: NATO, ethno-linguistics, and 
economic interests. This way, it has discussed in favor of three claims: Russia wants to impede 
NATO’s expansions, Russia has expansionist aspirations and intends to increase their sphere 
of indirect influence, and Russia strives for an economic expansion to the East. This 
groundwork then accumulates into a discussion of possible effects on the EU, giving plausible 
answers to the following open questions: Is it likely that Russia will wage war against the EU? 
How might Russian territorial expansionist tendencies affect the EU? And, what may Russia’s 
Eastern economic expansion mean for the EU? 
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 The answer to these questions boil down to whether the EU’s ingroup dimensions 
weigh heavier than the outgroup dimensions and if cooperation with the EU will boost national 
self-esteem. Even with continued Western meddling with FSU states and EU sanctions on 
Russia, the EU remains an ingroup on many dimensions. Thus, this thesis concludes that: a 
large-scale war between NATO and Russia, or the EU and Russia, is an unlikely outcome 
although regional wars remain a possibility; their eastern economic expansion will not have 
major effects on the EU’s economy, hence the EU will have leverage over Russia and so remain 
an ingroup on this dimension; and Russia is likely to continue striving for indirect influence 
over the FSU and other eastern state’s due to its statist developmentalist view on citizenship 
and its great power aspirations. Therefore, states of interest to Russia who are not a part of the 
EU or NATO risk conflict similar to the one’s in Georgia and Ukraine.  
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